INTOXICATING LIQUORS-INCREASING THE LIABILITY OF NEW
JERSEY TAVERNS: WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE?-Aliulis v. Tunnel

Hill Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 205, 275 A.2d 751 (App. Div. 1971).
Alita Aliulis, a sixteen-year-old minor, Cynthia Zulauf, also a
minor, and several others commenced a round of several taverns at
eight o'clock in the evening which concluded at Tunnel Hill Tavern
in the early hours of the following morning. While at Tunnel Hill
Tavern, Cynthia was illegally served alcoholic beverages, contrary to
a regulation of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control.' It is not
known whether Alita was served by the tavern and it was not demonstrated that Alita was intoxicated when she left.2 Upon leaving the

tavern, Alita and the others voluntarily accepted a ride in Cynthia's
automobile with full knowledge that she was unfit to drive her car at
the time. 8 After a stop for gasoline, Alita and the other passengers fell
asleep and Cynthia drove only a short distance before she collided with
another automobile. Cynthia was killed and her three passengers were
4
seriously injured in the accident.
Several actions were instituted; however, all were settled prior
to trial except a suit filed on behalf of Alita Aliulis by her guardian
1 Regulation No. 20, Rule 1, Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control, New Jersey
(1967) [hereinafter cited as ABC regulation] provides:
No licensee shall sell, serve or deliver or allow, permit or suffer the sale, service
or delivery of any alcoholic beverage, directly or indirectly, to any person under
the age of twenty-one (21) years or to any person actually or apparently intoxicated, or allow, permit or suffer the consumption of any alcoholic beverage by any
such person in or upon the licensed premises. (footnote omitted).
The statutory authority for the regulation is N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-39 (Supp. 1971-72). It
has been repeatedly held that:
Regulations promulgated pursuant to this authority have the [full] force and
effect of law.
Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15, 17 n.7 (3d Cir. 1961) (applying New Jersey law-ABC
regulations have effect of statute in establishing standard of care); Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 590, 218 A.2d 630, 635 (1966) (ABC regulations have effect
of statute designed to protect incompetents against consequences of own incompetency);
Cino v. Driscoll, 130 N.J.L. 535, 538-40, 34 A.2d 6, 9 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (Commissioner of ABC
has power to promulgate regulations having force and effect of statute).
2 Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 205, 207, 275 A.2d 751, 752 (App. Div.
1971):
At oral argument counsel agreed that despite the aforementioned activities, the
record did not demonstrate that Alita was intoxicated when she left the defendant
tavern.

Since the case is silent as to whether Alita was served in defendant tavern, this writer will
assume that she was not. This fact will be relevant to this writer's subsequent discussion
of the case but not to the court's ultimate holding.
3 Id. at 207, 275 A.2d at 752; Brief for Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant at
6-7, Aliulis v. Tunnel Hill Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 205, 275 A.2d 751 (App. Div. 1971).
4 114 N.J. Super. at 207, 275 A.2d at 752.
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ad litem, George Aliulis. Alita's claim sought recovery of damages for
personal injuries sustained as a direct and proximate result of the
Tunnel Hill Tavern's negligent service to Cynthia in violation of the
ABC regulation.
At the trial, the judge charged the jury that a determination of
proximate cause must be made before liability could be imposed upon
defendant tavern, and that plaintiff could not recover, regardless of
defendant's negligence, if the jury found plaintiff to be contributorily
negligent. 5 Although not requested to return with specific findings, the
jury found defendant tavern guilty of negligence and plaintiff guilty
of contributory negligence.6 A judgment in favor of defendant tavern
was entered and plaintiff appealed on the basis of the trial judge's
7
instructions on contributory negligence.
On appeal, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court reversed
and remanded for an entry of judgment in favor of plaintiff and a new
trial as to damages alone. Citing Rappaport v. Nichols," the court reestablished that fundamental negligence principles are applicable.
It is beyond question in this State that if a defendant tavern
sells alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of the regulation
of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control proscribing that
activity, such illegal conduct provides adequate support for a jury
verdict of negligence from which liability for injuries caused to
another by the minor may be adjudged. 9
The court went on to state that the inability of a tavern to assert the
defense of contributory negligence, established by Soronen v. Olde
Milford Inn, Inc.,10 extends to contributory negligence of third persons, as well as to the contributory negligence of negligently served
patrons of the tavern, and that
for reasons of policy clearly enunciated in Rappaport and Soronen,

contributory negligence is not available as a defense to the defendant tavern in the circumstances here presented."
Although barring the defense of contributory negligence, the court
balked at imposing strict liability upon the tavern by retaining the
5 id. at 208, 275 A.2d at 752. For a discussion of how the issue of proximate causation
bears on a tavern's liability, see Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 203-05, 156 A.2d I,
9-10 (1959).
6 114 N.J. Super. at 208, 275 A.2d at 752.
7 Id.
8 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
9 114 N.J. Super. at 208, 275 A.2d at 752.
10 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966), revg 84 N.J. Super. 372, 202 A.2d 208 (App. Div.
1964).
11 114 N.J. Super. at 208, 275 A.2d at 752 (emphasis added).
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traditional burden upon the plaintiff to demonstrate negligence and
proximate cause.' 2 This aspect of the court's decision is particularly
significant because, ordinarily, in the State of New Jersey, contributory
negligence is a total bar to recovery in a negligence action.1 3 Thus,
the A liulis court has, by unqualifiedly barring the defense of contributory negligence, in effect, ruled that all infant third parties, regardless of how competent they may be, are unable as a matter of law to
exercise a sufficient degree of care to protect themselves from negligently served tavern patrons.
During the last decade, at least nine jurisdictions have applied
fundamental negligence principles to the question of dram shop
liability. Among these jurisdictions are those which had followed the
traditional common law rule of nonliability, 14 those which had repealed dram shop acts, 15 and those which still had dram shop acts in
effect.' 6
The importance in New Jersey of the court's holding in Aliulis
can be traced back to the Prohibition Era when New Jersey had a civil
12 Id. at 210, 275 A.2d at 753. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 74, 78 (3d ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER], where the author states "contributory negligence
of the plaintiff is not a defense in cases of strict liability." Id. § 78, at 538.
13 George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 86 A.2d 8 (1952) (contributorily negligent
plaintiff barred from recovering against negligent railroad); Mattero v. Silverman, 71
N.J. Super. 1, 176 A.2d 270 (App. Div. 1961), cert. denied, 36 N.J. 305, 177 A.2d 341 (1962),
rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. Super. 449, 191 A.2d 797 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 41 N.J.
115, 195 A.2d 14 (1963) (slight contributory negligence a complete bar to recovery in
tractor-trailor accident); see Menger v. Laur, 55 N.J.L. 205, 26 A. 180 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (plaintiff's contributory negligence was a complete bar to recovery from defendant who negligently ran over the plaintiff's surveying instrument).
14 Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1963) (sale of alcoholic
beverages to minor in violation of statute declared negligence per se); Adamian v. Three
Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968) (declaration seeking recovery from barroom
for injuries sustained in collision with auto of drunken driver, who became intoxicated
at the barroom, stated cause of action); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d
755 (Ct. App. 1964) (sale of intoxicating liquor in violation of statute gave rise to
common law action against seller).
15 Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966) (in absence of special
statutory provision, principles of common law negligence should apply to cases involving
intoxicating liquors); Ramsey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965) (repeal of
earlier civil damage law left unimpaired the fundamental negligence principles prevailing
in N.H.); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964)
(repeal of dram shop act did not wipe out cause of action afforded victims of intoxicated
persons).
16 Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963) (common law
negligence action allowed where dram shop act had no extra-territorial effect); Berkeley v.
Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (complaint charging wrongful
deaths and injuries resulting from service of intoxicating liquors to inebriated persons
stated cause of action in negligence as well as under dram shop act).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:233

damage law, or dram shop act, imposing strict liability upon unlawful
sellers of alcoholic beverages. 17 However, the law was repealed in
193418 and replaced by the Alcoholic Beverage Law, l9 which left unimpaired the fundamental negligence principles prevailing in New
20
Jersey.
The most significant New Jersey case to date delineating the
negligence principles involved in serving intoxicants to minors and
inebriates has been the landmark Rappaport case. There, a succession
of taverns unlawfully sold alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated minor,
causing or contributing to his subsequent negligent operation of an
automobile which resulted in the death of an innocent third party.
The widow of the decedent sued the taverns, alleging that their service
of alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated minor constituted negligent
conduct which proximately caused the decedent's death. 21 The New
Jersey Supreme Court, applying fundamental negligence principles,
held that the widow had a cause of action against the taverns. The court
further stated that it could not hold, as a matter of law, that there could
have been no proximate causal relationship between the tavern's negligent conduct and the decedent's death. 22 In so holding, the court
rejected the position maintained in some jurisdictions that the consumption, and not the wrongful sale, of the alcoholic beverages is the
true proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries in a dram shop situation.2 Basing its decision on public policy, the court interpreted the
ABC regulation prohibiting service to minors and intoxicated persons
as intending to protect, specifically, these two classes of persons and,
more generally, the public at large. 24
17

Law of March 29, 1921, ch. 103,

§ 55, [1921] N.J. Laws 184; Law of March 17,

1922, ch. 257, § 1, [1922] N.J. Laws 628-29.
18 Law of March 14, 1934, ch. 32, [1934] N.J. Laws 104.
19 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-1 et seq. (1940).
20 Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 200-01, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959).
21 Id. at 192-93, 156 A.2d at 3-4.
22 Id. at 204, 156 A.2d at 9.
28 Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 356, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (1955) (patron's widow had no
cause of action against saloon for negligent sale of alcoholic beverages which caused
patron's death); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 248-51, 210 P.2d 530, 532-34 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1949) (sale of intoxicating liquor to inebriated minor defendant, which resulted
in injuries to plaintiffs, did not state cause of action against tavern owner); State ex rel.
Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254-56, 78 A.2d 754, 756-57 (1951) (in absence of statute, no
cause of action could be predicated against seller of intoxicating liquors for causing intoxication of person whose negligence caused injury to plaintiff); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa
358, 370, 92 N.W.2d 682, 689 (1958) (patron's negligent driving of automobile and resultant
tort were not natural consequences of tavern's service of beer to the patron). See also
Annot., 130 A.L.R. 352 (1941).
24 31 N.J. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8.
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Seven years after Rappaport, the prospective liability of taverns
was greatly increased when the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
Soronen. The case involved an action for wrongful death by a widow
whose husband suffered a fatal fall in the defendant tavern. Prior to the
fall, the deceased had been illegally served alcoholic beverages while in
an apparent state of intoxication. 25 The tavern owner asserted the defense of the decedent's contributory negligence, and the court was confronted with the issue of whether or not that contributory negligence
should be a bar to recovery.
The Soronen court prefaced its opinion by pointing out that the
plaintiff herself was not charged with any contributory fault, and
then proceeded to discuss a number of cases which denied the defense
of contributory negligence 26 on the basis of section 483 of the Restatement of Torts,27 which stands for the proposition that plaintiff's contributory negligence cannot be a valid defense when the defendant has
violated a statutory prohibition designed to protect a class of persons,
including the decedent, from the "consequences of their [own] incompetency. 28 The court, in concluding that the defense was legally
25 The case was remanded for retrial on the specific issue of whether or not the
decedent exhibited visible intoxication. 46 N.J. at 584-85, 594, 218 A.2d at 631-32, 637.
26 Galvin v. Jennings, 289 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1961) (applying New Jersey law--contributory negligence not a bar to recovery by patron for injuries suffered in automobile
mishap after being served at tavern while inebriated); Majors v. Broadhead Hotel, 416
Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965) (defense of contributory negligence not available to hotel
that served inebriated guest); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648
(1958) (recovery by inebriated patron for injuries received in bar brawl not barred by
defense of contributory negligence).
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 (1965):
Defense to Violation of Statute
The plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery for the negligence of
the defendant consisting of the violation of a statute, unless the effect of the
statute is to place the entire responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon
the defendant.
Comment:
c. There are, however, exceptional statutes which are intended to place the
entire responsibility for the harm which has occurred upon the defendant. A
statute may be found to have that purpose particularly where it is enacted in
order to protect a certain class of persons against their own inability to protect
themselves ...
Viewed by the Soronen court as being particularly illustrative of the case law dealing
with the exceptional statutes referred to in comment c are: Pitzer v. M.D. Tomkies &

Sons, 136 W. Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437 (1951) (child labor acts); Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein,
109 So. 2d 189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), afl'd, 116 So. 2d 421 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1959) (statutory
prohibitions against sale of firearms to minors); Koenig v. Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 N.Y.
313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948) (safety acts for protection of workmen). See W. PROSSER, supra
note 12, § 64, at 435-36.
28 Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. at 591, 218 A.2d at 635 (held that the
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insufficient, made it clear that its reasoning was designed to afford the
negligently served patron, not a negligent third party, a cause of action
against the tavern, despite the patron's contributory negligence.
In aid of the policy embodied in this prohibition, we held in
Rappaport that when injuries proximately result to a third person
from service to a patron who is visibly intoxicated, the tavern
keeper may fairly be held civilly accountable. In further aid of the
policy, a tavern keeper may with equal reason be held civilly accountable for injuries which proximately result to the patron himself. The accountability may not be diluted by the fault of the
patron for that would tend to nullify the very aid being afforded.
Since the patron has become a danger to himself and is in no
position to exercise self-protective care, it is right and proper that
29
the law view the responsibility as that of the tavern keeper alone.
A liulis has no direct precedent in New Jersey nor, apparently, in
any other jurisdiction.3 0 Although the fact situations in Rappaport
and Soronen are similar, they each differ from that of Aliulis in several
important respects. In Rappaport, the deceased third party was presumably innocent of any negligence proximately contributing to his
death, and contributory negligence was not an issue in the case. 31 In
Soronen, the deceased was an illegally served patron who was in an apparent state of intoxication and unable to exercise the degree of self32
protective care normally required of a plaintiff in such a situation.
Aliulis is clearly distinguishable from these cases in that plaintiff was
an apparently sober and fully capable third party who knowingly and
willfully accepted a ride with an illegally served intoxicated driver who,
according to plaintiff's own testimony, "was not fit to drive the
car ....

3

reasoning of § 483 of the REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRvs was appropriate, despite the
fact that the case was concerned with the violation of a departmental regulation rather
than a statute); see cases cited note I supra. For a discussion of the denial of the defense
of contributory negligence, see Prosser, Contributory Negligence as Defense to Violation
of Statute, 32 MINN. L. REv. 105, 118-23 (1948); Note, Contributory Negligence as Defense
to Statutory Tort, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 779 (1948); see generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 853
(1948).
29 46 N.J. at 592, 218 A.2d at 636.
s0 See Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969) (dicta to the effect
that contributory negligence by third party would bar recovery in jurisdiction applying
fundamental negligence principles to dram shop situations). For an informative discussion
on the problem of third-party contributory negligence in dram shop situations, see
Comment, Dram Shop Liability-A Judicial Response, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 995, 1024-26
(1969).
31 31 N.J. at 192-93, 156 A.2d at 3-4.
82 46 N.J. at 584-85, 594, 218 A.2d at 631-32, 637.
33 114 N.J. Super. at 207, 275 A.2d at 752. Brief for Defendant, supra note 3,at 6-7.
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Although plaintiff was a companion to the illegal drinking activities of Cynthia Zulauf, she was not herself served at defendant tavern. 4
However, plaintiff was apparently aware that her companion's activities
were illegal. Even in those jurisdictions having dram shop acts imposing strict liability on taverns, relief is often barred, under the doctrine
of complicity, to injured third parties who voluntarily participate in
the illegal consumption of alcoholic beverages by a minor or inebriate. 5
In some of these jurisdictions, mere willful association, or companionship, by a third party with an illegally served minor or inebriated tavern
patron during the illegal service has been held sufficient participation
to bar subsequent recovery by the third party from the tavern for injuries sustained as a direct and proximate result of the illegal service,
even where the third party was not himself indulging in the illegal
consumption of alcoholic beverages nor purchasing drinks for the illegally served patron. 36
It appears that the most reasonable interpretation of the A liulis
decision, which would bring plaintiff within the ambit of protection
afforded by Soronen, is that the A liulis court may have characterized
plaintiff as a minor patron of defendant tavern, due merely to her
presence at the tavern, and may have thus placed plaintiff within the
specific protection of the ABC regulation, creating a duty on the part
of defendant tavern not to expose her to an unreasonable degree of
risk by negligently serving her intoxicated companion, Cynthia Zulauf.
Viewing Aliulis in this light, plaintiff was not a contributorily negligent third party, but a patron of the tavern against whom, under the
literal interpretation of Soronen, the defense of contributory negligence
could not be asserted. The Aliulis court, however, did not base its
114 N.J. Super. at 207, 275 A.2d at 752. See note 2 supra.
35 Osinger v. Christian, 43 Ill. App. 2d 480, 193 N.E.2d 872 (1963) ("complicity" as
defense in a dram shop situation means that one who has participated in bringing about
intoxication of another cannot recover for resulting injuries).
36 See, e.g., Cookinham v. Sullivan, 23 Conn. Supp. 193, 179 A.2d 840 (Super. Ct. 1962)
(dram shop act does not contemplate giving remedies to one who contributes to violation
of it); Baker v. Hannan, 44 Ill. App. 2d 157, 194 N.E.2d 563 (1963) (drinking companions
of illegally served patron barred from recovery under dram shop act); Berge v. Harris,
170 N.W.2d 621 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1969) (participant in drinking activities is not an innocent
person entitled to protection under dram shop act); Kangas v. Suchorski, 372 Mich. 396, 126
N.W.2d 803 (1964) (drinking companion of intoxicated patron is not an innocent person
entitled to recover against tavern operator); Heveron v. Village of Belgrade, 181 N.W.2d
692 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1970) (affirmative participation in minor's intoxication relieves a
defendant tavern of civil liability to participating party); cf. Mitchell v. Shoals, Inc., 19
N.Y.2d 338, 227 N.E.2d 21, 280 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1967) (plaintiff's conduct did not
amount to guilty participation in situation where she did not cause or procure her
escort's intoxication). See also 48 C.J.S. Intoxicating Liquors § 446 (1950); Annot., 26
A.L.R.$d 1112 (1967).
34
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decision upon the Soronen reasoning, but instead decided the case
on the ground that it would be inequitable to protect a negligent
patron and not a negligent third party.
Finally, we see no reason for a distinction that would otherwise result: The negligent patron, more closely associated with the
wrongful act of the tavern keeper, receives the benefit of the unavailability of a contributory negligence defense to the tavern
keeper. The other members of the general public, less intimately
connected with the wrongdoing, do not, and this to the advantage
control to
of the tavern keeper, the party who had it within his
37
avoid implication by the exercise of reasonable care.
This reasoning would certainly indicate that the Aliulis court did
not believe that plaintiff's age was a crucial issue and, inferentially,
refutes the interpretation that the court based its conclusion upon
the reasoning that plaintiff, due to her tender years, came within the
class of persons intended by the Legislature to be protected against
the consequences of their own incompetency.
Generally speaking, however, third parties usually are neither
legally nor physically incompetent to protect themselves.38 Furthermore, contributory negligence is likely to affect only a small percentage
of injured third parties. 39 Thus, the availability of the defense of contributory negligence against third parties would hardly preclude an
entire class of persons from a civil remedy, as is usually the case where
contributory negligence is available as a defense against a class of
illegally served minors and inebriates. 40 It is, therefore, urged that the
court went too far in Aliulis in unqualifiedly barring the defense of
contributory negligence against third parties in dram shop situations.
Certainly, it is realized that
[t]hose who enter the licensed liquor business do so with full awareness that it is heavily fraught with dangers and that the members
of the general public as well as the individual patron are entitled
41
to receive . . . high measures of protection from its abuses.
In this sense, the imposition of civil liability upon a tavern for damages
resulting from its negligent service of alcoholic beverages strongly serves
the public interest and does not impose any "unjustifiable burdens"
upon it, for the tavern may readily protect itself "by the exercise of
37

114 N.J. Super. at 210, 275 A.2d at 753.

38 Comment, supra note 30, at 1026.

39 Id.
40 id.
41 46 N.J. at 592, 218 A.2d at 636.
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due care. ' ' 42 On the other hand, it may be an undue burden to impose
civil liability upon a tavern in circumstances in which a third party
who is fully capable of protecting himself proximately contributes to
his resultant injuries through a kind of aggravated misconduct or a
43
complete lack of self-protective care.
Surely, the fundamental tort concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause must control the extent of the tavern's liability if the
negligence principles called for in Rappaport and Soronen are to be
applied in a consistent and just manner. It is readily conceded that
some dram shop situations exist in which an ordinary degree of contributory fault on the part of a third party may be reasonably foreseeable, and hence, according to the weight of authority, would not break
the chain of legal causation. 44 However, there is substantial authority
to the effect that acts of wanton recklessness by a third party are, like
intentional misconduct, usually unforeseeable in most circumstances
and, therefore, are superseding causes which break the chain of prox45
imate causation.
42 Id. at 588-89, 218 A.2d at 634 (quoting from Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at
205-06, 156 A.2d at 10).
43 For a discussion on aggravated negligence and degrees of negligence, see W. PROSSER,
supra note 12, § 34, at 183-91.
44 For a discussion on the foreseeability of ordinary negligence and intervening
causes, see W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 51, at 309.
[O]ccasional negligence . . . is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and
therefore [is] to be anticipated.
Id. § 33, at 174 (quoting from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 302, comment 1 (1939)); Menth v.
Breeze Corp., 4 N.J. 428, 441, 73 A.2d 183, 189 (1950) (occupier liable for damage resulting
from fire started by third person, if act was reasonably foreseeable):
A tortfeasor is not relieved from liability for his negligence by the intervention
of the acts of third persons, including the act of a child, if those acts were
reasonably foreseeable.
See also Buccafusco v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 49 N.J. Super. 385, 140 A.2d 79 (App.
Div. 1958) (defendant electric company not relieved from liability in a situation where
its negligence combined with some other independent but foreseeable intervening cause
to occasion the harm); Somerset Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Explosives Sales Co. of N.J., 28
N.J. Super. 210, 100 A.2d 325 (App. Div. 1953) (test of proximate cause is foreseeability
according to the common experience of mankind).
45 Defendant in Aliulis asserted, by the way of cross-appeal, that the jury did not
find proximate causation. This contention was apparently grounded upon the belief that
the jury, knowing that a finding of contributory negligence would bar recovery, ignored
the issue of proximate causation in finding defendant tavern guilty of negligence. However, the Aliulis court refuted this argument by stating that the jury was adequately
charged on the necessity for a finding of proximate causation in determining negligence,
and that a finding of proximate causation must necessarily be equated with their finding
of negligence on the part of defendant tavern. 114 N.J. Super. at 210, 275 A.2d at 753. See
RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 440 (1939):
A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its
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New Jersey no longer recognizes any meaningful distinction between the concepts of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. 4
For instance, in the leading case of Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,4 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that in a negligence
action there are but two real issues, negligence and contributory negligence. 48 Some four years later, a similar conclusion was reached by the
same court in the case of McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co.,49 where
the court stated that
the term "assumption of risk" is so apt to create mist that it is
better banished from the scene ....

Henceforth let us stay with

"negligence" and "contributory negligence."50

New Jersey courts also do not appear to recognize any meaningful
distinction between degrees of negligence. However, New Jersey still
recognizes a kind of wrongdoing called wanton and willful misconduct which is characterized by behavior which is " 'so gross as to evince
recklessness or design.' "51 The established test in this jurisdiction for
wanton and willful misconduct is as follows:
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.
W. PRossER, supra note 12, § 64, at 436-37:
[I]f the plaintiff's own conduct is "wilful," "wanton," or "'reckless," it will be
balanced against similar conduct on the part of the defendant, and recognized
as a bar to his action.
See also Roadman v. Bellone, 379 Pa. 483, 108 A.2d 754 (1954) (relates concept of superseding cause to automobile negligence situation); Reek v. Lutz, 90 R.I. 340, 158 A.2d 145
(1960) (relates concept of superseding cause to landlord and tenant problem); Johnson v.
Cone, 112 Vt. 459, 28 A.2d 384 (1942) (discusses concept of superseding cause in terms of
efficient intervening causes in automobile negligence situation); Eldredge, Culpable Inter.
vention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 121 (1937); cf. Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 23
N.J. Misc. 89, 41 A.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (discusses concept of superseding cause in
terms of natural, probable and possible consequences in negligence situation involving
stone quarry accident).
46 Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 51, 155 A.2d 90, 94 (1959)
(concepts of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are "indistinguishable in ...
nature"); Benton v. YMCA, 27 N.J. 67, 69, 141 A.2d 298, 299 (1958) ("used interchangeably');
White v. Ellison Realty Corp., 5 N.J. 228, 235, 74 A.2d 401, 404 (1950) ("virtually identical"); Castino v. Di Menzo, 124 N.J.L. 398, 401, 11 A.2d 738, 739 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ("barely
distinguishable"); Scheirek v. Izsa, 26 N.J. Super. 68, 75, 97 A.2d 167, 169 (App. Div. 1953)
(twins); see James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952); Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d
1218, 1227 (1959).
47 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959).
48 Id. at 54, 155 A.2d at 96.
49 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963).
50 Id. at 276, 196 A.2d at 240-41.
51 Tabor v. O'Grady, 61 N.J. Super. 446, 450, 161 A.2d 267, 269 (App. Div. 1960)
(quoting from Vandegrift v. Rediker, 22 N.J.L. 185, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1849) (defendant
guilty of wanton and willful misconduct as matter of law for wild and reckless driving
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"To establish a willful or wanton injury it is necessary to show
that one with knowledge of existing conditions, and conscious from
such knowledge that injury will likely or probably result from
his conduct, and with reckless indifference to the consequences,
consciously and intentionally does some wrongful act or omits to
discharge some duty which produces the injurious result." (Em52
phasis supplied).
Wanton and willful misconduct, when expressed in terms of culpability,
thus appears to represent a kind of misconduct or wrongdoing which
is located somewhere on a scale between negligence and intentional
wrongdoing.
The case of Tabor v. O'Grady" is particularly illustrative of the
legal consequences which may attach to a finding of wanton and willful misconduct on the part of either or both parties in a negligence
case. Tabor involved an automobile negligence action in which the
defendant, the driver of the injury-producing automobile, was found
to be guilty of wanton and willful misconduct as a matter of law. 54 The
case was remanded for retrial for a determination of whether or not
the plaintiff, who was injured while a passenger in the defendant's
automobile, was also guilty of wanton and willful misconduct for
knowingly and willfully exposing himself "to the danger of riding or
continuing to ride" in the automobile of the defendant. 55 The Tabor
court ruled that if the plaintiffs were subsequently found to be guilty
of ordinary contributory negligence, then they could still recover, but
if the plaintiffs were found to be guilty of contributory wantonness,
then they would be barred from recovering, since both plaintiffs and
defendant would be guilty of the same kind of wrongful behavior. 56
The issue of the kind of misconduct of which defendant was guilty
of automobile). See McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 266 A.2d 284 (1970)
(evidence did not show defendant guilty of wanton and willful misconduct as matter
of law for maintaining a dangerous diving board); Eagen v. Erie R.R., 29 N.J. 243,
148 A.2d 830 (1959) (railroad's failure to provide a watchman did not amount to
wanton and willful misconduct); Staub v. Public Serv. Ry., 97 N.J.L. 297, 117 A. 48 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1922) (railroad not guilty of wanton and willful misconduct for running its trains
over its private right of way without warning).
52 Tabor v. O'Grady, 61 N.J. Super. 446, 454, 161 A.2d 267, 271 (App. Div. 1960)
(quoting from Staub v. Public Serv. Ry., 97 N.J.L. 297, 300, 117 A. 48, 49-50 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1922)).
53 61 N.J. Super. 446, 161 A.2d 267 (App. Div. 1960).
54 Id. at 452-53, 161 A.2d at 270-71.
55 Id. at 456, 161 A.2d at 272.
56 Id. at 453-54, 161 A.2d at 271. See also 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 179, at 856 (1941);
65A C.J.S. Negligence § 131, at 110 (1950); 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTs § 22.6, at
1213-15 (1956); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 482(2), 503(2) (1956); Anont., 41 A.L.R.
1379 (1926).
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was not raised by plaintiff in A liulis. In order to avoid the defense of
contributory negligence on these grounds, plaintiff had to assert, either
in her pleadings or by pre-trial motion, that the defense of contributory
negligence was legally insufficient in the face of defendant tavern's
aggravated kind of misconduct. Since the issue was not so raised, it
could not be charged to the jury or urged for the first time on appeal."
The Tabor court has, in effect, held that the faults of the parties
may be compared for the purposes of determining the availability of
the defense of contributory negligence. The court made certain to point
out, however, that its decision was in no way an adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence, by stating that "[t]he doctrine of comparative negligence involves a reduction of plaintiff's damages in
proportion to his negligence," while its rule simply holds that a "plaintiff's [ordinary contributory] .

.

. negligence has no legal consequence

whatever" in situations where the defendant is guilty of wanton and
58
willful misconduct.
Tabor did not involve a negligent tavern and is clearly distinguishable from the instant case on these and other grounds. Nevertheless,
the case has significance as a particularly illustrative example of an
opinion shared by a growing segment of the legal profession of this
State, namely, that a serious wrongdoer should not escape liability altogether because of a relatively trivial misstep on the part of the other
party. 59 This view was most recently reinforced by Justice Francis of
the New Jersey Supreme Court in his concurring opinion in O'Brien
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,6o in which he severely criticized the doctrine
of contributory negligence as
almost universally regarded as unjust and inequitable [for imposing]

...

an entire accidental loss on one of the parties whose

57 Borelli v. Frollani, 98 N.J. Super. 203, 236 A.2d 613 (App. Div. 1967) (legal
insufficiency of a defense must be asserted in pleadings or at trial in order to be
framed within scope of issues submitted to jury). But see Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270,
173 A.2d 1 (1961) (rule requiring affirmative pleading of contributory negligence is
mandatory, but rule should be relaxed when its enforcement would be inconsistent with
substantial justice).
58 61 N.J. Super. at 452, 161 A.2d at 270.
59 The legal consequences attaching to wanton and willful misconduct, which are
illustrated in Tabor v. O'Grady, were recently reaffirmed in McLaughlin v. Rova Farms,
Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 266 A.2d 284 (1970). See also Chazen, An Equitable Concept of Comparative Negligence, 94 N.J.L.J. 785 (1971); Haugh, Comparative Negilgence: A Reform Long
Overdue, 49 Ox. L. REv. 38 (1969); James, et al., Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L.
Rav. 889 (1968).
60 59 N.J. 114, 125, 279 A.2d 827, 833 (1971) (Francis, J., concurring).
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negligent conduct combined with the negligence of the other party
to produce the loss. 61
In most situations, it is the plaintiff who is victimized by the defense
of contributory negligence, but occasionally, when the defense is unqualifiedly barred, as in Aliulis, the defendant may also be victimized
by being forced to bear legal responsibility for the entire loss, even
though he may have been only slightly responsible. Justice Francis, in
O'Brien, suggested a far more equitable solution:
If fault is to remain the test of liability, then the doctrine of comparative negligence which involves apportionment of the loss
among those whose fault contributed to the occurrence is more
consistent with liability based on a fault premise. 62
In summary, it appears that the A liulis rule, barring the defense
of contributory negligence, is fundamentally fair when applied to thirdparty dram shop situations where the plaintiff is guilty of only ordinary
and foreseeable contributory negligence. In cases of this nature, justice
and sound public policy require that the plaintiff should not be forced
to bear the whole of a loss which could have readily been prevented
by the exercise of a reasonable degree of care on the part of the defendant. Some human frailties are to be expected and foreseen, and it
appears to be quite reasonable to require a defendant tavern to foresee such negligence on the part of a plaintiff and to take reasonable
precautions to avoid contributing in any manner toward injuring him.
On the other hand, it appears unreasonable to unqualifiedly bar the
defense of contributory negligence to taverns in third-party dram shop
situations, because it is just as inequitable to subject a negligent tavern
to full liability in a situation where a plaintiff through his own wanton
and willful misconduct is responsible to a far larger degree for his own
injuries than is the tavern.
Clearly, then, a balance needs to be struck if a sound, general rule
is to be arrived at which will fairly limit the liability of taverns in thirdparty dram shop situations without placing undue burdens upon the
third-party victims. There seems to be no clear-cut and simple solution under existing New Jersey law. It appears that application of the
doctrine of comparative negligence to such situations would offer the
most reasonable solution toward providing
Id. at 126, 279 A.2d at 833.
Id. Justice Francis went on to state that:
Since the present bar of contributory negligence is judge-made law, our
authority to humanize that law by adopting comparative negligence is not open
to reasonable question, and the time seems ripe to make the change.
Id., 279 A.2d at 834.
61

62
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a more just and socially desirable distribution of loss than that
ever achieved by the application of the long-standing rule of contributory negligence.63
A variety of formulas which express the general fault-sharing
principles taught by the doctrine of comparative negligence have been
applied in other jurisdictions." However, Justice Francis suggests the
formula adopted by the State of Wisconsin as a "fair formula which
has been in operation for some years. '"6 5 The Wisconsin rule is:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by
any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death, or in injury to person or property, if such
negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering.16
Certainly, it is arguable that the adoption of such a formula for
comparative negligence would produce a fairer measure of justice for
the tavern in third-party dram shop situations, while at the same time
it would further the avowed public policy considerations referred to
in Rappaport, Soronen and Aliulis. Situations where a jury would find
a non-patron plaintiff guilty of a degree of contributory negligence
amounting to a majority, or a high percentage, of the total fault for
the accident would seldom occur, and verdicts could be reached solely
by apportioning the loss among the parties in proportion to their relative negligence, without resorting to a possibly unjust and inequitable
application of the rule of contributory fault, or some confusing variation thereof. Yet, in situations where a non-patron plaintiff is found
to be guilty of a majority of the total fault for the accident, the tavern
would be provided with a reasonable defense and would not be inequitably forced to bear the brunt of a loss for which it was only
67
marginally responsible.
Terrance A. Turner
Id., 279 A.2d at 833.
Examples of the three most common formulas for comparative negligence may be
found in the following statutes: ARK.STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1730.1, -1730.2 (1962 repl.); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 1454 (1956 repl.); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966).
65 59 N.J. at 127, 279 A.2d at 834.
66 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966).
67 On Dec. 6, 1971, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed this decision, holding
that the defense of contributory negligence is not available under the circumstances of
this case.
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64

